Islamist Al-Shabab fighters attacked a base belonging to ATMIS in Somalia (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) in Bulamarer, 130km (80 miles) southwest of the capital, Mogadishu, on Friday. The military base, which housed Ugandan forces, resulted in unconfirmed casualties. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the attack and provided photographic evidence, stating that they had killed 137 soldiers.
Since 2006, this group has been fighting to topple the government and establish its own rule based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud launched an intensive offensive last year after winning the elections, resulting in significant gains in eroding the group’s control over vast swaths of land. However, Al-Shabab remains capable of launching significant attacks on government, commercial, and military targets, as demonstrated by yesterday’s attack.
This raises questions about the sustainability of foreign intervention in Somalia and its likelihood of success. Evidence from other interventions elsewhere shows otherwise, indicating that such interventions only prolong the conflict. The same holds true for Somalia.
Somali’s problem is internal, and no foreign military intervention can truly solve it. It is irrelevant how well-financed, equipped, and trained foreign military forces sent there are. Without Somalis actively resolving their internal political contradictions, the country will continue to be engulfed in perpetual conflict.
That was the dilemma the United States found itself in, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the US military boasting exceptional training, extensive funding, and state-of-the-art weaponry, it faced one calamity after another until sanity prevailed over denial in Washington, and the Americans accepted defeat and left the country to the Taliban.
We are seeing a replay of that scenario in Somalia. ATMIS cannot fix Somalia. The core problem lies in the country’s domestic political landscape, demanding a resolution solely driven by its own people. Let’s give war a chance. Let the Somalis fight until one side secures a decisive military victory or both warring sides are exhausted and find mutual accommodation more profitable than warfare.
ATMIS in Somalia and other external actors should learn a lesson from the US and NATO’s failure, particularly in Afghanistan. After 20 years and $2.1 trillion spent, with $800 billion dedicated to training and equipping the Afghan army, the US ultimately quit, leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban. We should leave Somalia to Al Shabab. If Somalis don’t want them, they will fight them themselves.
ATMIS contributing countries should retrace their plans: What is the main objective of their mission in Somalia? How have they defined the criteria for success? How long is the mission supposed to last in order to achieve that success? What are the key indicators of success? Additionally, what is the exit plan and strategy?
Otherwise, without answers to those questions, ATMIS has deployed blindly in a troubled country, carrying all the risks of a prolonged military intervention where the chances of success, as the Americans discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, are virtually nonexistent. ATMIS leaving is easily the only way to end that conflict while staying is easily the best way to prolong it.
